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Socrates: Now call to mind that this is not what
I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many
holy acts but to tell the essential aspect, by
which all holy acts are holy; for you said that
all unholy acts were unholy and all hoty ones holy
by one aspect. Or don't you remember?

Formulation 2.f
I n ~ Poetic Method

~

Method

2f Aristotle, Elder Olson begins his

I

interpretation of Aristotle's Poetics by quoting a passage from
A. E. Taylor's Aristotle:

No especial recognition • • • is given in Aristotle's
own classification to the Philosophy of Art. Modern
students of Aristotle have tried to fill in the omission by adding artistic creation to contemplation e.s
a third fundamental form of mental activity, and thus
making a threefold division of Philosophy into Theoretical, Practical, and Productive. The object of this
is to find a ~lace in the classification for Aristotle's
famous Poetics and his Pshetoric. But the admission of
the third division of Science has no warrant in the
text of Aristotle, nor are the Poetics and Rhetoric,
properly speaking, a contribution to Philosophy. They
are intended as collections of nractical rules for
the composition of a pamphlet or a tragedy, not as a
critical examination of the canons of literary taste.2
By revealing the Poetics to be a treatise of Aristotelian productive science, Elder Olson intends to refute most, if not all,
o.f the above claims.

Presumably, he thinks he can reveal this

by showing the method~ implicit in the composition, of the
Poetics to be basically the same as that of productive science
and of science in general._

This is to say, by revea.ling the

method of the Poetics to be a snecific application of Aristotle's
general scientific method:

a causal elucidation of the nature

of a subject and the demonstration of attributes which inhere
in this subject primarily.

If one sees that the Poetics is a

specific application of Aristotle's general scientific method,
the conclusion follows that the Poetics must be viewed as having

the same philosophical stature as Aristotle's theoretical and
practical writings.
Elder Olson claims, and this is the primary point around
which his interpretation turns, that the Poetics must be viewed
in the light of the whole body of the Aristotelian philosophy,
that the correct interpretation follows from seeing it in this
way.

Therefore, his procedure is to interpret passages from

various works where Aristotle s9eaks of things allegedly necessary
to an understanding of the Poetics, its method of composition
and purpose for being written.

These things, variously found

in the text of Aristotle, are:
1.

what knowledge, especially scientific knowledge,
meant for Aristotle

2.

what constitutes science

3.

the general method and aim of science

4.

the division of science into theoretical, practical,
and productive

5.

the "subject" of productive science

6.

the method and aim of productive science

These considerations form the first 9art of his essay.

Next,

he considers the Poetics itself as a treatise of productive
science.

And last, he draws conclusions concerning the powers

and limitations of Aristotle's poetic method for present - day
writers and critics.
As Elder Olson relates it, for_ Aristotle there are three
basic kinds of knowledge - knowledge of facts, knowledge of
individuals, and knowledge of universals - which vary "according
to the object of knowledge, the nature of what is lmo"m, the
faculties involved, and the end of the knowledge. 11 3

Knowledge

of universals, however, is rrmch more complicated than the other
two kinds, for this knowledge enables one to have knowledge of
a subject plus knowledge of attributes which inhere in the subject primarily (of necessity).4
Knowledge of facts is gained through the senses, and all
animals, since all possess the sense of touch, are able to lrnow
some facts.

Also, those animals, such as man, "with more senses

have additional channels of information."

But knowledge of

facts, which is "provided by sensation," is by itself "instantial
only" - "knowledge • • • that this particular flame is hot"
(as Olson puts it).5

So, at this level of knowledge an animal

may know such things as red, hot, loud, etc., but these may be
one time occurrences, if unremembered - that is, if the animal
hasn't a faculty of memory or this faculty is insufficiently
developed.

The ca:pacity for knowledge at this level might pro-

perly be termed sentience, and creatures fixed at this level
called sentient creatures.6
Knowledge of individuals is gained through the memory.

Some

animals have the capacity to recall that something, say, is hot,
and man, moreover, is capable not merely of sunple~
menting present sensation by past (remembering) but
also of so unifying memory that several memories of
the same thing have a single effect; this capacity
Aristotle calls empeiria, experience.
Where sentience is knowledge of facts, "experience is kn.o·:rledge
of individuals":
it).7

"That flame generally is hot" (as Olson puts

Individuals are made up of repeatedly remembered and asso-

ciated (unified) facts.

And animals fixed at this level of

knowledge might :pro:perly be called creatures of experience:

They

know enough to come in out of the rain, though they don't know
what rain is .. 8

Knowledge of universals is gained through the intuitive
faculty.

This is lrnowledge "of the cause of the fact" - "why

flame is hot" (as Olson puts it).

Science, part of it, is

knowledge of universals and their causes.

This nart of science

Olson calls "induction," for it proceeds from knowledge of facts
to knowledge of individuals to the intuitive perception of the
common causes of individuals which fall under a single universal.
This part of science proceeds, then, through induction to a
causal definition of various individuals called by the same name
("falling under a single universal").

This definition, in turn,

is the first principle of the science of that universal, but
the formulation of this principle is only part of this science,
since
scientific knowledge is not constituted simply by
lmowledge of universal 2nd cause. Sensation, ·which
gives particular information, is not scientific,
but neither is intuition; if reference of individual
to universal ~.vere all, intuition ·would be scientific
knowledge, induction would be the solitary scientific
process, and science would consist of scientific
principles only. We moderns tend to classify the
sciences 2.s inditctive or deductive; Aristotle thought
that all sciences a.re both, in the sense that principles achieved throu~h induction are utilized to
demonstrate, through causal reasoning, the inherence
of attributes in a subject.
Thus, any science is both knowledge of a universal and its
cause, achieved through induction and intuition, and "knowledge
of (its) cause(s) as appropriate to • • • the inherence of
attribute in subject," achieved through deduction (demonstration
or proof) .9
Sciences will differ according as inherent attributes,
subjects, and causes differ, and different "sciences must necessarily differ in their principles":

the causal definition of

the universal.

But the method of different sciences, in virtue

of their being science, will in general be the same, since science consists of
principles intuitively derived from experience of
particulars, and all will be concerned \·ri th proof,
via cause, of the inherence of attributes in a
subject • • •
In specific cases, however, methods will differ - again:

"according

as subjects differ, attributes and proofs of their inherence will
differ • • • n10
Having established the nature of science in its inductive deductive method and the pur,ose of science in its end, knowledge
both of what something is and of why it is what it is, Olson
next claims that "Aristotle divides the sciences into three
groups, the theoretical, the practical, and the productive, or
'poetic,' sciences. n11

For the most :pa.rt these groups are dis-

tinguished by their ends.12

The end of theoretical science is

knowledge; of practical science, action; and of productive science,
"the uroduct to be prod11ced. 11

Also, in his works Aristotle

makes many correlative distinctions, such as the
numerous ones bet·ween "knm·ring, 11 11 doing, 11 and
"making 11 • • • 13
Particular sciences under the heading of theo·retical are metaphysics, mathematics, and physics.

And those unc9.er the heading

of practical ar8 ethics and :pr1i tics, 1:rhile thr:>s~ under the
heading of productive "are the arts, whether useful or fine • • • n
These distinctions made, the next consideration is what the
scone and structure of productive science must be.
Olson begins this consirl.eration by 2.sking, "In the first
place, is scientific knowledfZ:e of poetry possible? 11

He re-olies
..
'

Not • • • if it is a matter of the accidental or
the incidental. There is no science of the accidental
for Aristotle • • • hence, to ask whether a science
is possible is to ask whether some subject can be
found in which attributes inhere, and that not accidentally.14
Through some rather involved reasoning, Olson concludes that
"poetic .science cannot center in the artist" or in the activity
of -production (the making of the product), so "we are left with
the product itself as a possible subject. 11
determines the scope of nroductive science.

The product, then,
Also, it determines

the stru~ture (method), since "all art is concerned with coming
into being" (making), where
a form in the mind of the artist is imposed upon his
medium to produce the artistic composite • • • 15
of form and matter.

Olson illustrates this by citing as an

example a sculptor who imposes a human form in his mind upon
marble to create a statue of a human.

So, in creating, the

artist must first reason "from the form to be produced to the
first thing vrhich can be produced"; then, he must make the
product according to this reasoning, by starting from the first
thing and proceeding to the form.

Only the reasoning part,

however, is "in a sense scientific knowledge of the productive
kind."

And since an artist wants to make not only productions

but "productions excellent of their kind • • • such reasoning
will have to include not merely the 'nature' of the thing
intended but its

I

excellence 1 as ,.-,ell. n 16

In the conclusion to the first '!)art of his essay, Olson
g5-ves a summary of the scope of any productive science:

It

is the rational nart of -:-,roduction centering in, and
indeed based upon, the nature of the product; and the
structure of such sci??nce may be described as hypothetical

·•T•

regressive reasoning, taking for its starting point,
or principle, the artistic whole which is to be produced and proceeding through the various parts of the
various kinds to be assembled • • • Since the reasoning
is based unon a definition of a certain whole as its
principle and since that a.efini tion must be arrived at
in some fashion, any productive science must consist
of two main ~arts: inductive reasoning toward its
principle, and deductive reasoning from its principle. • •
He next states that "the Poetics clearly follows this general
pattern" (is a treatise of Aristotle's productive science):
Chapters i - v are concerned with establishing the
definition of tragedy (induction), which is given
in chapter vi; chapters vi - xxii resolve tragedy
into its proper parts (deduction) • • •
Moreover, Olson thinks the conclusion necessarily follows that
the definition on which everything centers is no mere
statement of the neaning of a term or name, as ':Te
ordinarily think of definition nowadays; it is a statement of the nature of a whole produced by a certain art;
and it is introduced, not merely to clarify meanings a
little but much more importantly, to serve as the princinle
of the art and hence as the basis of all reasoning. 1 7, 18

Criticism
If the point of Olson's interpretation were only to refute
the claims of A. E. Taylo:r;, given the cogency of his account of
Aristotle's method, this reader thinks that the point has been
achieved.

With good assurance of being cqrrect, one could claim

that Aristotle's intention in writing the Poetics was to give a
rational account of the art

9f writing tragedy, not merely to

provide a book of practical rules, and that this account is
comparable in philosophical stature, in virtue of common method
and intention, to Aristotle's theoretical and practical writingse
However, Olson claims much more; refutation is merely the springboard.

Not only does he claim to have ,inteJ'.'.'Preted correctly what
1

Aristotle said, but also he claims, both i~plicitly and explicitly in his presentation, that .,..,hat Aristotle said is correct,
or true.

Olson is a modern day proponent of·Aristotle's method

and do.ctrine.

This means, I take it, that he would proceed in

much the same way as Aristotle in answering the question, What
is tragedy? - or the question, a corollary determination, whether
an individual play - let us say, The Father, by August Strindberg is a tragedy.

For myself at least, this procedure and the doc-

trine uuon ,.,,,hich it is based nresent three kinds of difficul tie·s,
those concerning
1.

the coherence of Olson's account of the general inductive - deductive met'hod of science, as presented

2.

the re1ation of the purnorted inductive - deductive

·method of the Poetics to the general method of
· science, as presented

3.

the co~clusions believed to follow from the presentation.

Problems of ·the sort in two and.three stem from those in one. 19
To begin, though Olson fails to mention this, kinds of
knowledge are differentiated in Aristotle according·to their
causes - material, efficient, formal, and final - as follows:20
Purpose?

Material

Efficient

1•. K. of facts
2. K. of individuals
3.K.of universals

facts
individuals
universals

senses
memory
intuition

Knowledge

Object of K.

Faculty

Formal
sensations
:perceptions?
conceptions?

Final
movement?
action?
theor,.r?

Nature of ·what
is known

End

But this table.is misleading because what is being characterized
is dynamic in man, rather than static.

Though anima~s, including.

individual men, get stuck at any one of these levels - one, two,

or three - some men have the capacity to function on all three
levels.

-

This. is to say.that some men have the :potenti~l to acquire

knowledge at one level and move on to the next, until they have
acquired universal knowledg~ and·the truths derivable from the
knowledge ~f universals.

Since the means of acquiring knowledge
,

and of moving from one level to the next are certain faculties,
this account of how men acquire knowledge is psychological.

Also,

in the dynamic account, knowledge of individuals may be plugged
in as the material cause of knowledge of uni,rersals; likewise
knowledge of facts may be :pluggecl. in as the mat~rial cause of
knowlede;e of individuals.

This means that knowledge of universals

is acquired through knowledge of individuals, "in some fashion,"
this knowledge reflecting (corres~onding to) the relation of
individual to universal in reality; likewise for knowledge of

individuals acquired through knowledge of facts, this knowledge
reflects the relation of fact to individual in reality.

This is

to say that knowledge of facts, individuals,· and universals
comes from sense-experience, is effected through certain faculties,
and contains certain ends.
The trouble with the above account, whether one sees the
account as static or dynamic, is that a clear account of causes
is not given.

How does one acquire knowledge of causes?

Are

they induced through experience, deduced in a theory, or intuited?
If induced, then there must be four :primary kinds of knowledge:
of facts, individuals, universals, and causes.

But we are told

that scientific knowledge is knowledge of the cause of the fact.
Therefore, having scientific knowledge of causes - wher·2 causes
have a status conparable to that of facts, individuals, and universals - would entail giving the causes of the cause, but this
would lead to an infinite regress.

Possibly, one may get around

this by saying that knowledge of universals is know·ledge of the
cause of the fact, as above, but meaning by this that causes
are "seen" at the level of inti..1.ition only, and thereby preserving
the three :primary kinds of knowledge.
status of causes remains mysterious.

But even saying this, the
Moreover, if causality

makes its appearance only at the intuitive level, knowledge of
facts will be a fact and knOi·!ledge of individuals an indi vj_dual,
since these are respect; Yely dist:i_nguished as kinds of knowledge
through their causes.

At this point, it becomes extremely diffi-

cult to distj_nguish knowledge of universals from knowledge of
facts or knowledge of individuals.

The concepts get confused.

In the foregoing I have intended to point out that the
psychological account of how we acquire knowledge breaks down

As

when it comes to accounting for knowledge of universals.

related, the way we acquire knowledge is a kind of natural process,
natural in virtue of our being men.rather than a lower form of
animal:

sensations give rise to ~erceptions which give rise to

intuitions (conceptions?).

But, the way it is told, the passage

from sensation to perception (or exuerience or knowled[:e of
individuals) takes nlace as a matter of course; whereas that
from perceptjon to intuition does not - a question must be asked,
Why? - why not?

Further, this whole account of how v,.re acqu.:'Lre

knowledge becomes confused when Olson states that a man may
''have theory without experience" or experience without theory.
The reason for his saying this is obvious enough.

Often,

when a man is asked to give an account of how he did something,
how he Wl!ote a t~agedy for ins+.ance, he is unable to do so; on
the other hand, another ·man may be able to account fo:r why a
play is a tragedy, but be unable to ,:rri te a tragedy. 21

rp.,

:l:ne first

man would be a man of experience without theory; the second, a,
man of science without experi.ence.

But, to recognize that men

differ in these respects is one thing; to account for these
differences through th~ presentation of a psychological account
of how we acouire knowledge quite another - es-pecially if the
coherence of such an account depends upon such differences not
occurring.

Olson contradicts himself when he triAs to account

for differences between men, while,at th~ same time, he tries
to be consistent in his account of how men ac~uire knowledge:

-12-

~~science~, strictly speakinR," nroduced

.2J!!_Qf e'X'T:'erience, rather than identical with it.

For experience is knowledge· of individuals, while
-art and science are knowledge of universals, and
al though in reference to action and nrod11ction • • •
men of exoerience alone succeed better than those
~ ~ theorv without exnerience, experience :provides knowledr:e of the fact, but not of the cause
of the fact, whereas artistic and scientific
knowledge is of the cause. (Italics miD:e)22
In one breath Olson says that theory (art and science) is
produced out of experience; in the next he says that a man
may have theory without experience.

This contradiction is

both a manifestation of a confusion which persists throughout
Olson's interpretation and an index to seeing the interpretation aright.23

For instance, it will--not do to tag the process

-

froIJ). sensation to percep;tion to intuition,
part of the process may drop out:
out experience."

11

induction," when

A man may "have theory with-

Sine~ "to have experience 0 means that one

thinks he is able to do certain things (write tragedies for
instance), to say that "science {is) ••.• _produced out of
expe1:9ience 11 should mean·that·the scientist is able to do these
same things and more, to tell why he is able to do -them.
same goes for the artist:

He doesn't make mistakes.

The

However,

this is not the case,-either as Olson relates it or as one's
experience :of sci.entists and artists would i~dicate.

Why :Q.ot?

If Aristotelian science is not based upon experience, upon what
is it based?
Nor, as another instance, will it do to.base the rationale
of productive science upon ,,,hat takes place in the mind of the
artist in the process of production, since this begs the question
whether the artist is a man of experience without theory (a.nd he

-,..; ..

shouldn't be) or a man of science with experience (who hap:oens
also to be possessed of experience).

One does not say, therefore,

that the rationale of productive science is the same as what
takes place (the reasoning) in the mind of t:he artist during
creation (can one see, or experience, what is taking place there?);
but, given this rationale, one says that c2rtain things, conscious
or unconscious, must take place in the mind of the artist if he
is to produce works of art.

Again, upon what is productive science

based, if not u:9on experience?
The question is:

given that men are basically the same, in

virtue of possessing the same facul t::.es and having access to the
same facts, individuals, and universals, how is it that they come
to differ? - some men, so the account goes, being

1.

men of experience without theory

2.

others, r:ien of experience with theory

3.

still others, men of science without experience

4.

and yet others, men neither of science nor experience

One may say, "Well some men·have bad memories, or they count
some things to be facts 1,vhich aren't f3.cts 2t all, or their
intuitions are mistaken; and this accounts f0r the differences
among ·men.:"

But then, what sense is there in givi.ng a psycho;,.

log~_cal account of how we ac0uire knowledge, since something
more must be added to ensure that one is indeed acquiring knowledge
and not the illusion of knowledge.
The way Olson relates it, men

c

cq_qi.re knowledge more or

less as a matter of course, naturally, in virtue of being men
rather than some lower form of ar.imal;
process "induction."

anrl

he dubs this natrral

The next step is to be.se the genere.l

-14inductive method of ' science, the induction of universals from
particulars, u~on what happens naturally anyway.

But by reminding

oneself of the differences among men, one sees that, rather than
being psychological, this account is c~nceptual.
the scientific method is already at work.

In the account

which is to say that

Olson contradicts himself.because of conceptual confusion; science
arises not out of experience, as he relates it, for a man of
experience seemingly ,,,ould feel no need of science, but for other
reasons and in virtue of a method.
What are the reasons for, and method of, science?

Science,

Olson tells us, is concerned, .not with "the accidental or the
incidental," but
·• ·• • with what happens always or for the most part,
,with what is necessary or probable; hence, to ask
whether a science is uossible is to ask whether some
subject can be found ·1~4which attributes inhere, and
that not accidentally.
He goes on to say that such a subject, where productive science
is concerned, is "the product to be produced. 11 25

But how do.es

this "fact 11 about science relate to the psychological {in
reality, conceptual) . account of how we acquire knovlledge?
way I see it is this:

The

Men of experience, possessed of knowledge

of individuals, are able to do certain things, but they may make
mistakes because they 9_lace too much emphasis on the ·wrong things.
For instance, a man of experience who knows what tragedy is in
'
terms of its individuality
will be able to write a tragedy;

'
perhaps a good one, but he will also be capable
of writing a
I

bad tragedy or what·he thinks will be a tragedy which, when written,
turns out to be :ri.o tragedy at· all.

A ma.l"J. of experience alone

is unable to distinguish attributes necessary to, :from those

incidental to, a play 1 s being a tragedy.

Science, through

its method, seeks to ensure that the man of experience will
not make such ~istal,ces.

In this res~ect, science seeks to

augment ex:9erience; it is involved in a quest for certainty;
and it proceeds by distinguishing the necessai'1J in experience
from the accidenta1.26 ·
The conclusion follov1s that science, or the auest for
scientific knowledge (certainty), arose for this reason:

Men

began to doubt that experience provided an adequate basis for
a man's spying that he knows what something is and for his
being correct in saying this.

The question is, Why did men

begin so to doubt experience?27
So experience, so far from being a uart of science, in
the sense that science is produced out of it through some kind
of psychological inc'l.uct±ve process,·· is opposed to science.
This is another way of saying.that causes are not induced; if
they were, the man of experience would have universal knowledge;
but the man of science, conc_erned with the causes of things, is
ih onposi tion (so far as claims to knm·rledge go) to the man of
experience, whose concern is doing (making) things.

Crucial,

then, to an understanding of how scientists distingu.ish necessary
from accidental attributes - sup-posing this ca..11. be done - is an
understanding of the method by which th~y seek to do this; and
crucial to 2.n und.erstand:i.ng of this method· is a grasp both of
the c:,uestion the sciEmtist 2sks, the reason. for his asking it,
and of the social context in which it is asl,ced.
As Olson relates it, the scientific method consists in determining the causes of what a thing is; and this method is :preceded

.,,o-

by asking, "Why is this thing what it is?'~

Where an elucidation

of the nature of tragedy is the concern, the correlative question
and method of productive.science are. to ask "Why is this tragedy
a tragedy?" and to ascertain the causes of tragedy.

Giving the

causes of tragedy, it is claimed, definitively ans·we~s the ques.
.
.
tion, and from this definition, or principle~ one may demonstrate
by reasoning from the causes the adherence of necessarr attributes
in tragedy.

From this it is clear.that when Olson says "subject"

or "product," in this instance, he means to say "tragedy 11 ;
tragedy, he believes, is a proper subject of productive science.
This is to say that tragedy is "found" by the scientist to be a
subject of the required sort for scientific interest - a "whole,"
that is, possessed of necessary attributes causally relate~, but
distinct from individual tragedies.

.

These partake of the tragic

nature, essentially, and so are distinguished as tragedy, but
each is possessed also of accidental attributes which make it
the individual tragedy that it is.
Indeed, when one inspects the "inductive" T)art of the·E,QP.tics,,
one sees th~t it consists.of Aristotle's differentiating. tragedy
from epic and comedy through the method of the four causes.

Here

there is no extensive comparison a.nd contrast of individual
tragedies; with the view of determining co:mmon ca.use, that would
warrant the phrase, "inducing from particulars"; rather, such
an extensive procedure, which might be comparable to modern
science's inductive nethod, is totally neglected.

We are given

inste2.d a technical :9rocedure _characterized by "the answers we
give to the question, Why is this tragedy, a tragedy'?" - "because
it imitates a certain object, in a certain manner, through a

-,

certain medium 11 28

-

,-

because, that is, it has a certain formal,

a certain efficient, and a certain material cause.

These three

causes, ":re are +old, are enough to differentj_ate tragedy from
epic and comedy, but tragedy is distinguished as a form of art
by its final cause ::rhich has historically undergone a series of
progressive changes.

So, having distinguished tragedy from

other forms of art by its serious action, dramatic manner, and
poetic medium, Aristotle then gives an account of the successive
final causes through which tragedy has gone, these being:

to

give pleasure, to instruct morally, and to be written as an end
in itself.

These Olson calls, respectively, the hedonistic,

ethical, and artistic final causes . of tragedy.

Having dis-

tinguished tragedy =rom other forms of art and as a form of art
itself, Aristotle then collects the four causes in the form of
a definition of tragedy.

******
From what has been said, the following elucidations may be
made:
1.

The scientific method is already at ·work in Olson's

psychological account of how we acquire knowledge.

This is to

say that the account is concentual, rather than psychological.
To say, by giving the four caus"'·S of kno :.rledge of facts, that
1

one has kno·.,,ledge of facts is to define, through the method of
the four causes, what is to count as a fact.

A fact is some-

thing in the external world (material cause), grasped by the
senses (efficient cause) in the form of a sensat1on (formal
cause), a.'t'J.d effecting certain mov"?men-::.s (final cause) of a -physical

nature.

The same goes for individuals and universals.

An indi-

vidual is something in. the externai world, grasped by the memory
in the form of a perception, and effecting certain activities of
~

physical - ~ntellectual nature; whereas, a universal is some-

thing in the external world, grasped by intuition in the forn of
a conception, and effecting certain reasonings (mental activities)
of a theoretical nature.

Thus, to have knowledge of facts, indi-

viduals, and universals is to ·define them in the same way that
tragedy is defined:

through the method of the four causes.

Clearly, to say that knowledge of universals is lmowledge of the
cause of the fact is not only confusing, but redundant.
say;

One should

Knowledge of the universal, hotness, ~hich is clearly a fact

as facts are defined, is knowledge of the causes of hotness.
However, from the above it is not clear, as yet, upon~ considerations~ defining activitv 1.§. based.
2.

It will not do to say that sensation provides knowledge

of ~acts, since creatures at ~he sentient level have no knowledge
of the causes of facts.

Scientists have knowledge of causes.

One must say that sensations correspond to facts, but only the
scientist knows what the fact is; likewise, for men of experience,
perceptions correspond to individuals, but only the scientist
knows what the individual is.

3.

The point of saying that men of experience have knowledge

of individuals is to provide
knowledge of universals.

a

foil for men of science ~·.,ho seek

The point is the same as that of the

following dialogue:
Scientist: Tell I:1e, tragedian, 'db.at is tragedy? Tell
me this, if you will, that I Mi,'?;ht know ~..,hen I see a
play whether it is a tragedy or not.

Tragedian: Why gladly, man of science, what you ask
of me is easy. The M;amernnon, King ~ ' and, let us
say,~ OediDus 2f. Seneca are all tragedies.
"When asked what something is, the man of exnerience noints to
individuals; that is what it means to say that· he he,s knowledge
of individuals.
4.

The conceptual difference (so far as claims to know-

ledge go) between the man of experience and the man of science
may be seen if the dialogue is contj_nued:
Scientist: But this is not what I meant in asking
you what tragedy is: to give me a list of plays
which, in :e our ouinion, are tragedies. PA.+,::ier, I
want you to tell me what the essential form of
tragedy is which makes all t'!'agic plays tragic.
Do you ~gree, or not, that all tragic plays, the
ones you mentioned included, if they are tragedies,
are tragic in virtue of a conrnon fonn.
7

Tragedian:

I see.

Yes, I agree that it must be so.

Scientist: Well, then, tell me what precisely, this
ideal is, so that, with my eye on it, and using it as
a standard, I can say that any play 1-vri tten b:v yon or
anyboiy else is tragic if it rese~bles this ideal, or,
if it does not, can deny that it is tr2gic.
It does not occur to the ma..Yl. of experience that he shon1d first
discover (find, define) the common form of all tragic pl2.ys in
order to ensure that, when he says some individual :9lay is a
tragedy, he will be correct in saying this.

Yet, when the

scientist points this out to him, he agrees - it occurs to him
that this must be the c2.se - and he may even sa"

7 ,

11

Ifow I see that

all the plays which I have heretofore called 'traa.-edies' must
have a common form."

Probably, at this time, it also occurs to

him that he must already know what the common form is.

\·Jh:r? -

because he has been speaking a lan.<_',"Uage for some time prj_or to
these occurrences.

5.

Knowing what the common form of tragedy is cannot be

based on knmving that an individual play, or
plays, is a tragedy.

a

collection of

It is the other way around.

This is to

say that the form which the enquiry takes throws into doubt the
correctness (truth) of all prev:i.ous assertions regarding individuals.

Therefore, the correctn~ss of the a.ssert~_on, "all the

plays which I have heretofore called 'tragedies'have a common
form," cannot be based on the correctness of the assertion, "This
play, or this collection .of plays, is a tragedy".

Science can-

not be based upon experience since, if it were, it would be
subject to the same doubt (whatever the nature of this doubt
might be) that experience is subject to.

6.

Between the man of exoerience and the mRn of science

exists an unbridgeable gap, characterized by doubt, a auest for
certainty, and a ouestioning attitude.

One may say of the former

that his pointing to individual -rlays and calling them "tragedies"
indicates that he recognizes what the common form is, th6ugh
he hasn't had occasion to doubt and want to knm.,, what this common
form is, and that, given such a.'1. occasion and the consequent
articulation (envisioning) of the form, he (as a man of science)
will be able to .say (tell) which of his previous assertions
were correct.

While of the latter, the scientist or man in doubt,

one ma~r say • • • ?

?.
is this:

Supposedly, the correct procedure, as I understand it,
One first defines what tragedy is, notices that a play

conforms to or cl9sely resembles this definition, and. then makes
the correct assertion, "This play is a tragedy. 11
definition on9 may deduce necessary attributes.

Also, from the
Still, it is

difficult to see on what such a definition will be based, if
not on a collection of plays knmm. (recognized) to be tragedies.
8.

The scientist must make a distinction between knowing

and recognizing a form (essence, necessary qualities or features).
If his activity is to make sense, this distinction must be
meaningful:

Recognition of a form means that it is seen but not

understood, while knowledge of a form means that it is both seen
and understood.

Further, to say that a form is seen but not

understood is to say that it is understandable; to say that a
form is both seen and understood is to say that it is intelliGranted these distinctions, one may say of the man of

gible.

experience that he confuses the feeling that a form is understandable with a..~ understanding of it.

He recogni~es ~he common

forms of things - his usage of the_ same word to refer to many
things is evidence of this - but, when asked to do so, he is unable
to pick out what the coIP.mon form is.
this.

He lacks a method of doing

Rather, wheri asked, "What is tragedy?", the man of ex.9erience

points to an individual.

His 9ointing to an individual in answer

to this ouestion indicates that he has confused the recognition
of a form with an understanding of it.

9.

The method of the four causes is employed by the

scientist to -oick out the comr,:on forms of things.

It is clear

that this method is based ·x·'.1on an ass1i.m-otion about how language
gets its mee..ning, rather than upon some :9s~rchological inductive
process.

This assumption is that the meaning of a word is t~e

object to which the W'.)rd refers; and, ·.·:here many things (individuals) are cEdled by the same name (gen2ral word), they are
called so in v:· rtue of a cor:imon :form to which the nane refers.

When one wants to pick out the common form, however, one needs
a method to do this - a method of distinguishing the common
form both from attributes peculiar to the individuals and from
other forms.

Unless the common form of many things called by

the same name is distinguished, one may make mistakes either in
referring to individuals or in trying to make, do, or know individual things.

·with reference to tragedy, then, the need of a

method of definition arises when one recognizes that "tragedy" is
a word, as opposed to mere babble, but is unable to nick out that
to which the word "tragedy" refers - the assumption being that
the meaning of a word is the object to which the word refers.
10.

It is clear that the method of the four causes, as

Olson describes it in relation to tragedy, is based in part, not
unon an induction from particulars, but upon the recognition of
"tragedy" as a word.29

This recognition is enough to ensure that

tragedy is a subject, or product, of the desired sort for scientific interest, i.e. a subject "in which attributes inhere, and
that not accidentally."

One may mistakenly use this word.- say

- that a particular play is a tragedy, where it is not - but usage
of the word, whether correct or mistaken,. is irrelevant to the
method of definition.

Rather, since "tragedy" is recognizably

a word, there must be (or have been) correct usages of the word plays of which it is correct to say that they are tragedies and one of the purposes of the method is to obviate mistaken
usages by showing which will be correct.

The method of definition

does not rest then on a collection of (one or many) plays known
to be tragedies, but the defining activity ~resu~poses that such
a collection might be known.

------- --c...1-

11.

The method of definition must rest on a collection of

plays recognized to be tragedies, but does not preclude the
possibility that members of the collection might not belong to
it.

If this is not the case, the defining activity is absurd.

As described, this method consists in causally distinguishing
tragedy from epic and comedy, and as a form of art itself.
12. · The question persists:
this causal· determination based?
definitive?

Upon what considerations is
And further, what makes it

And furthermore, why not call it the method of

the four \vbys, Reasons, Answers, or Responses we give to the
question, "W'ny is this thing the thing that it is, if it is this
thing?i'

*****
This "poetic.method," mysterious as it is, Olson claims
to be the true one so far as "mimetic" art is concerned.

And

the method becomes even more mysterious when he claims:
Aristotle was not concerned with everything which
we should call poetry, and aJ..so he W? s concerned
.with so!Tle things that we should no long~r call "90etry.
It will not do even.to say that he was concerned
with tragedy, epic, or comedy, for the significance
of these terms has altered since his day. He thought • • • .
of tragedy as ~oetry similar to the Oedinus of
Sophocl 0s, not to the Oedinus of Seneca or The White
Devil.' ·
When the method is the true one, but the definition non which
everything centers" changes, this reader wonders at the intelligibility of what is being said.
If Aristotle's method only enabled him to define Greek
tragedy, not the tragedy of Senaca, h01.·r will his definition help
me to see whether any particular play (let us say, .

~

Fe.th er)

is a tragedy?
definition?

P.1n I to employ the method only, and ignore the
But the employment of the method is contingent

u:pon my recognizing not only a collection of plays as.
tragedies - if asked, I would. be inclined to say, "Yes, that
play is a tragedy 11

but also a collection of plays as comedies,

-

The problem is:

etc.

1dhat if I were inclined to say that the

Oedi nus of Seneca, the Agamemnon, 8.nd say King Lear are all
tragedies?

How am I to restrict my recognition to col:1_ections

of plays, for each of which the significance of the corresponding
term is the same?

2f

The question is:

cours2_,

~

definition t e l l s ~ ~ - -

Is·to say that there are such things as

forms of art to say that all art works called by the same name
have the same form?
question.
S2-n.ec8.

Olson wc1.nts to say

11

yes II and "no" to this

He answers "no," since he says that th~ Oo,d.;pus of'

arrl the Ueo i us of Sonhocle s are both called "tragedies, 11
0

but are different forms of tragedy.

He answers "yes," since

he claims that,
as new forms of mi"'etic art emerge, th': theor:r c2.n be

extended to cover them as well - urovided +hat the
extensj_on is 1?Y one v.rho has suffi9ient knowledg~ of
and skill in Aristotle's method.5
So, tragedy is a form of art, but the signific::ince of "tragedy"
may change; that is, tragedy ma.y

11

emerge ii as a new form of art

( in different perj_ods or cultures, I supnose, since Olson
contrasts the tragedy of Seneca with that of Sophocles).

But,

this description of the state of affairs leads inevitably to the
(!uestion:

How is one to distinguish a form of art from snecific

works of art?

------

-25The very basis of the method is the assumption that all
things called by the same name have something in common (be it
nature, form, common attributes or features) in virtue of which
they are so called.

When this correspondence of name and sig-

nificance is undermined, the subject matter of productive science
-is threatened with disappearance.

For 'instance, one may consider

both the Aga~emnon of Aeschylus a...~d the Oedipus of Sophocles to
· be

tragedies, and yet question whether they have a common form.

(As presented, Aristotle would not have raised this question.
He would have said, "If they are called 'tragedy,' then they~
have a corn.man form.")

Such questioning leads inevitably to the

consideration that Aristotle, rather than defining tragedy or,
for that matter, Greek tragedy, may have only defined the tragic
nature of a specific work (let us say, the Oediuu.s of Sophocles) ..
This "definition" was seen by Aristotle to be the norm o;r- :paradigm
of good tragedy, or, as we may see it, of Greek tragedy alone.
In conclusion, the picture I get here of Aristotle is that
of a man pointing - at something?

-26-

Summary
Olson's account of a true poetic method is incoherent for
the following reasons •
. 1.

His psychological account of how men acquire knowledge

is marred by an equivocal, if not contradictory, usage of the
word "knowledge."

Olson says that all sentient creatures possess

knowledge of at least some facts, and that men of experience
possess knowledge of individuals.

By definition, however, the

scientist is the only person who might possess knowledge, since
he is concerned with the causes of things.

According to Olson

himself, "to possess knowledge of a thing" means to articulate
the four causes of a thing.
2.

The suggestion that the man of experience already knows,

prior to the intuition of causes, what an individual is leads one
to think that the inductive method of science is a merely routine
procedure of gathering together individuals already kno~m through
sense-experience, and of intuiting the four causes (the form which
these individuals have in common) from this collection of individuals.

However, if such a proc~dure does characterize the

inductive part of science, there is no evidence of the procedure
in what Olson claims to be the inductive part of the Poetics.
Of course, one might claim that Aristotle merely failed to mention,
an oversight on his part, the collection of rlays from which he
drew his definitions of t;re.gedy, comedy, and epic.

In any event,

-27since the procedure presupposes that one already knows what the
individuals are - that The Father is a tragedy, that The Ag-ameri.non
is a tragedy, etc. - it is difficult to see how the procedure
and the resultant definition are to be of any use in coming 12_
~

whether any play fresh off the -oress is a tragedy.

Even if

Olson's account of a true -poetic method were coherent, the definition arrived at would lack the flexibility required to handle
borderline cases, those instances where the question arises:
this play a tragedy?

Is

Indeed, that this question might be asked

at all strikes right at the foundation of Olson's method of
definition, the notion that a definition of tragedy might be
drawn or intuited from a collection of plays, since the plays of
which the question is asked, the borderline cases, are ones
where men have failed to find agreement.

This is to say that

the notion of a collection of plays from which the definition
of tragedy is to be drawn presupposes a consensus of opinion as
to what plays are to be included in the collection.

It is not

a matter of one man's choice.

3.

Though it will not do for Olson to say that e:x:perience

provides knowledge of individuals, he uses the word
in quite another sense in his account.
means capacity to do or to make.
capacity to ,'ITite a tragedy.

11

experience 11

In this usage "experie:i1ce"

The man of experience has the

Of course, since he lacks precise

knowledge of what it is that he is writing, the man of e:x:perience
sometimes realizes his capacities and sometimes does not.

So,

apart fron. Olson's shaky usage of the wo:i::-d "knowledge," he
suggests that the intuition of c~uses is the end result of a
causal chain of sense-ex9er5_ence, where "exnerience II is to· be

-------- :.2a~--

understood in the above sense.

The scientist should be able not

only to define tragedy, but to write one as well.

4.

Olson's account of how men acquire knowledge through

some kind of psychological.~ inductive urocess is doomed inherently to self-destruction precisely because of the presuppositions
underlying his nethod of defining universals.

That causes are

seen at the level of intuition and that only scientists are concerned with causes are presuppositions of Olson's method of
definition, yet facts, individuals, and universals are. all defined
according to their causes.

This means that both facts and indi-

viduals are universals, since by definition universal·s are conceived at the level of intuition - the same level at which causes

are intuited.

Clearly, to say that one gains knowledge of facts

through the senses or knowle~ge of individuals through the memory
contradicts the fact that facts and individuals are conceived
through the intuitive faculty.

Olson's psychological account,

therefore, has no bearing at all on his method of definition.
In this paper my conc~rn has been to lead the investigation
out o:f the back alleyways of faculty psychology into a world
where men talk, some of them poetically, to one another.

In

claiming that Olson's account is conceptual, my intention has
been to show both where the not~on of forms first entered into
human discourse 2.nd what the picture of language, underlying the
notion, is:

the nicture of language as a naming activity.

picture dictates two assumptions e.bout language:
1.

When :'lany +hin:-;s ?..:!"e called by the same name, they
are called ~o ~_n virtue of a coII1.mon form to which
the name :!'efers.

This

-- ----t!.':J-

2.

The meaning of a word is the object {form) to which
the word refers.

The method of the four causes is presented as a means of picking
out these forrr..s, of defining the meanings of words.

NOTES
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Literature, ed. by Elder Olson (Chicago, The University of
Chicago Press, 1965), p. 176.
4rt is not clear whether a subject is the same as a
universal.
501son, Aristotle's Poetics, p. 176.
6rs the fla~e a fact? or its hotness? or both? Does it
make sense to say that lmowled.ge of facts is, for example,
knowledge that this particular hotness is a flame or that this
hotness is a particular flame? OlsonJs way of talking here
is confusing to say the least. On the analogy of tragedy,
which he gives.later, the questions one may ask are:
(a) Why is this flame hot?: v'ihy is this tragedy tragic?
(b) W'ny is this fla!ne a flame?: ·1tn1y is this tragedy a tre,gedy?
(c) Why is this hotness hot?: 1vby is this tragic(ness) tragic?
But (a) does not fit, since giving the four causes of hotness
does not define the essential nature of flame, but of hotness
(or heat). Is the question, )'/hy is this flame hot?, at all
comparable to the ci.uestion, V,hy is this tra5edy tragic?, or to
the question, T,fuy is this pot-bellied stove hot? I think that
Olson should say h2re, in ord9r to be consistent, that our senses
give us ci:.:>rt2.in kinds of .i..nforTJation about the world (not, surely,
that th12re 2.re flames out there) on the analogy of a':108b8.s, snr1ils,
and dogfishes. For instance, infornation Fl.bout 11otness, J_oudnef:s,

redness. A dogfish, for example, placed in close proxi~ity to a
flame might feel. the heat. This would be evidenced by its flipflopping to get e;way_ from· it. But would it see a flame, or a
brightness? At this level of knowledge, the abi1ity to tell (say)
what is out there does not enter in; rat.her, one reacts in
certain ways. Sensation, then, pr".'lvides kno\•rlea.ge of facts, or
qualitjes. At the sentient level, to say that one has knowledge
of facts is to say that one reacts in certain ways.
701son, Aristotle's Poetics, :g. 176.

8 It iR dif'.ficult to understand what is being said here, in
the eq_uation of knowledge of individuals with knmvledge that flame
generally is hot (as an exam:ple). It is not clear how facts are
to be distinguished from individuals. Why does it sound funny to
say that the knowledge that hotness generally is flame is knm·rledge
of an individual (hotness)? On the·analogy of an a:pe: Where does
the notion of a banana enter in when all the ape sees is yellowness with black strines in a field of green?
He is able t o ~
!12Jli, peel it, and eat it. Through memory he has associated
these doings w"~ th the yellowness. But does an ape see a banana,
or yello~mess in a field of green which may be picked,_peeled,
and eaten? Let us say the ape does not associate the gutteral
sounds he makes with the yell_ovrness. To say that "several
memories of the same thing have a single effect 11 i3 to say that
s·everal .memories of' the s~e associated fac-t.s are associated with
the sounds we make in the presence of those facts. The single
effect is a name, and language originates in custom, habit, or
convention and in a social context.
In the fnllowing discussion of universals, however, Olson
reve~ls another W8.Y of looking at how we come to ,assess knowledge
of the world. He equates knm·'l edge of uni irersals with 1mowledge
of "why flal"J.e (in gene~al) is hot" - o::.-, kro':.·.rled,1:;e "of the cause
of the fac·c. 11 In this sche1"2e of -thi.ns~s to explain why fla"!le in
general is hot is to explain why a particular flame is hot. So,
the account is:
(a) that-a-particular-flame-is-hot is a fact of sentience
.

.

(b) that-flame-in-g;eneral-is-hot is a fact (individual)
of experience,
(c) why-flame-is-hot is a fact (universe.1) of science
He wants to say that a snail, say, does in the :presence of a
flame see the flame and feel its hotness, though it doesn't know
(have any idea) ~.-,hat the flame or hotness is; that .an a:pe does
see bananas, has repeated remembrances of particular bananas
being yellow, though he cari.not say "banana II or tell ..,,,hy they are
yellow; and that men can both say "that flame is hot" and know
why it-is hot.
901son, Aristotle's PoAtics, :p. 176-177.
101£.!£.., p. 177.
11 lli_!!., p. 178.
1 2olson doesn't give the other causes, though I gather that
they must in general be the same for each of the three branches
of science.
1301son, Aristotle's Poetics, p •. 178.
141.!ui!.·, p. 179.
151P.i9_., P• 180.
16 Ibid., p. 180-181.
17Ibid., p. 181 •
18Aristotle's definition of tragedy, therefore, fulfills
three functions:
(a) It captures in words the natur~ of tragedy.
(b) It clarifies meanings.
(c) It ,rovides the principle whereby an artist is to make,
and a critic is to judge, a tragedy.
It is a "real" definition, the first princi~le of a theory of
tragedy, and a definition for the purpose of criticism all rolled
into one.

An internretation of Olson's account of how we acquire

knowledge, consistent with the "power<-," of this definition,
might run something like the follm,.ring: As he relates it,
Aristotle's definition of tragedy is arrived at through induction from particulars, and this inductive I"lethod of definition
is in turn based unon a psychological account of how men
acquire knowledge.
Our senses give us information about the ·world.. They are
"cha:nnels" through which information uasses from the world
to us. Phis information takes the form of sensations (or
sensible forms) which corres-pond to f2cts (factual forms) of
objects in the world; "the knowledge provided by sensation is
of the fact alone" ("that a particular flame is hot"). At
this level of knowledge sensations co:rrespond to facts in the
world, and both flame and hotness are inst::mces, as y~t unrelated,
of facts. Sense perception is innate in all a..~imals, but in
some sense-impressions come to persist because these ani:,_c;ls
possess the faculty of memory. Through the memory, past sensations (facts) are associated with present ones, and "man is
capable • • • of so unifying memory that several memories of
the.same things have a single effect." This means that one
eventually, through the memory, com~s to associate hotness with
flame; and this association, regularly re,eated, cones to oe a
"oneness." 1irnen one sees a -flame, one knows that it will be
hot, without having to touch it. The knowledg8 i~hat flame is
regularly accompanied by hotness produces the knowledge "that flame
generally is hot." This ca!)::tci ty to relate and individ1.rnlize
sensations (facts) "Aristotle c?lls empieria, exnerienc,e."
"Eroerience is knowledge of individuals."
But knowled_c;e of an individual is only kncrwledge of attributes.
It :is conceivably, rr~-linguistic kno·:rledge. In the precP.nce
of a flame, th-rough experience, one could know that it is hot
without being able to say that it is hot. (With the· invent ion
of langu2.ge, one would eventually be .able to noi~+, to a fl2-""1e
and s oy, "That is a fla~e, don't tr:rnch it! It is hot! 11 - to a
child perhaps.) Scientific knm·:ledge, hm·rever, is discursive and
0
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"demonstrative"; it arises out of experience, from knowledge
of the common attributes of individuals of these.me class.
Scientific knowledge comes about because man is able
intuitively to see the common forms of individuals in his
sensible experience~ Intuition, however, precedes articulation,
either articulation of the forms (universals or names) or of
knowledge of the for!!ls. Intuitive cognition (recognition)
is required for the invention of language; intuitive knowledge
is prior to the possession of scientific knowledge, which is
gained through demonstration and discourse. This means that
one's cognitive intuition of a coI!lID.on form entails recognition
of an individual's being in a form coI!lIIlon to other individuals,
but does not necessarily entail (though such cognition is a
requirement for) one's being able to articulate either the forn
(name) or what the form is. (One may think the cow-form without being able to say "cow.") TJitui ti ve knowlea.ge, however, is
knowledge .Q.f fil fQ.m com.rnon to individuals of the same class
(name); and possession of this knowledge enables one to articulate what the form is. Such articulation presu.pposes the invention
of language (names). The articulation of this knowledge answers
the question: 1fn.at do individuals called by _the same name (word)
have in common? The general, concise form of this question is:
What is X? The anm·rer will take the form of a definition which
links the name (class or word) to the knowledge - something of
the form, Xis so-and-so - and will serve to distinguish attributes
common to individuals of the same class from those attributes
peculiar to the individual. This knowledge of the common form
makes scientific knowledge possible. (In order to discouse on
a subject and to make true st2tements about it, one must know
what it is he is talking about.)
19Because the problems involved in Parts two and three of
Olson's essay stem from those involved ·with the presentation of
the general scientific method, I have chosen not to give separate
accounts of what Olson says in these Parts but to inclua.e these
accounts in my criticism.

-620 1 have inserted "Purpose II as that which may be s~1.bsti tuted
for the material cause of knowledge of facts; to complete the
picture, as it were, though I don't know if this conpletion makes
any sense. Call it an intuition: In Aristotle's (Olson's) scheme
of things a rational purposive universe manifests itself in the
facts (monads).
21 1 don't mean to beg the question here. I just mean to
point out that when one asks a man who claims to be an artist
why he is able to do what he does - to articulate his rationale one doesn't always get a coherent account; sometimes the artist
is unab'le to give an account at all.
2201son, Aristotle's Poetics, p. 176.
23 If Olson were consistent, in saying "experience provides
knowledge of the fact" he would be saying that the man of experience possesses scientific kno·wledge of facts. Possession of
knowledge means that a person has intuited the causes. ~nis is
to say that the man of experience would be able to say, 11Hotness,
which is clearly a fact as facts are defined, is • • • (the four
causes). 11 But only scientists are concerned with the causes of
things. Therefore, it is either a contradiction in terms or an
equivocation to say that experience (something prior to science)
provides knowledge of facts, out not of the cause ~f the fact.
24 01son, Aristotle's Poetics, p. 179.
25 This is question begging. Is the subject an individual
play or several plays, or is it tragedy in general? What does
it mean to be concerned 11wi th what hannens e.l·ways or for the
most -i::,art" where the subject is an individual play? That Othello
always kills DesdemonB.? No, unless the play is subject to the
director's interpretation; in which case the play ceases to be
an individ.1..1.al. One :must see that to speak of individuals is to
contrast these with universals, that "individu.al 11 eets its
meanine; here in contrast to "universal" which is the subject, or
product, :produced and the concern of productive science. But
upon seeing this, -th~ ind. 1.J.ctive !'art of science disa.ppears.
~
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26 This makes inappropriate Olson's illustration of the
rationale of productive science through analogy with shoe making.
Olson says that the rationale of productive science is analogous
to that involved in making a shoe: A form in the mind of the
maker is imposed upon his medium. This is done, in the case of
a shoe, by reasoning from the form (shoe-form) to be produced
to the first thing or :part which can be produced, then making
the shoe in reverse of this reasoning, cutting the necessary parts
and stitching them together, until the composite of fo:rm and
matter is produced. Here, to have scientific knowledge of shoe
making,is to be possessed of a :pattern, but there is no talk
of necessary ver~~s accidental attributes.
Compare a Dair of penny loafers to a pair of white bucks.
Both are pairs of shoes. Is the penny-hole of the penny loafer
a necessary attribute of its being a shoe? ii1hat do all individual
kinds of shoes have in common? When,· for ·what reason( s), would
such a question be asked? 1:lh.en would one become involved in the
quest for an essential pattern of shoe making? When would one
ask any of the following questions: ·
(a) vlh.y is this shoe a shoe?
(b) What is a shoe?
(c) ~bat do all shoes have in common which makes them shoes?
27 The fact that men oftentimes make mistakes, or err, is not
a sufficient reason for doubting ex::perience - at least not
according to Olson's account of how ·we acquire knowledge - rather,
a man must first entertain t11.e donbt, then noint to this fact to
support his doubt.
The man of eXDerience 1 ·rou1d not doubt that he knows what
something is because .he makes mistakes or errs. He would be
inclined to try to correct his riistakes; for instance, he would be
inclined to rewrite a tragedy vrhich didn't quite co1"1e off. ReDeated
failures would indicate a le.ck of ':?X9erience. This is to say
that he would eqnate a lack of experience with a lack of knowledge.
One might observe here that we are now leaving the psychological, and entering the social, context.

2801son, A~istotle's Poetics, p. 183.
2 9·The recognition of "tragedy" as a word implies, from the

preceding anc.lysis, the follo·wing auestions:
(a) Why is this word "tragedy" a word?
(b) VJhat is a word?
( c) What do alJ worc:ls have in cornmon which makes them words?
The corresponding questions concerning the recognition of a play
as a tragedy are:
(a') 1,fay is this tragedy a tragedy?
(b') 'What is (a) tragedy?
(c') What do all tragedies have in corm:ion which makes them
tragedies.
The corres9onding questions concerning the recognition of a thing
as a thing are:
(a") Why is this thing a thing?
(b") 'What is a thing
(en) What do all things have in common which makes them
things?·
Etc.
300lson, Aristotle's Poetics,?• lS8.
3'1Ibid.,: p •. 188.,
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